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Getting Title VII Back on Track: Leaving Allison Behind 
for the Robinson Line 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In Robinson v. Metro-North Commuter Railroad Company,1 the 
Second Circuit created an important circuit split by departing from the 
Fifth Circuit’s opinion in Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corporation.2 The 
circuit split concerns the proper interpretation and impact of the 1991 
Civil Rights Amendments on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 
23. Two issues are at the heart of the split: (1) the availability of 
compensatory and punitive damages in a Rule 23(b)(2) class action; and 
(2) the power of federal courts to creatively sub-class, bifurcate, or 
modify Title VII proceedings under Rule 23(c)(4). These legal 
differences also have significant practical impacts because: (1) potential 
plaintiffs are unable to rely upon the federal courts to enforce Title VII 
civil rights claims; and (2) potential defendants are almost completely 
relieved from the large monetary and public relations liabilities 
concomitant with class action litigation. 
This Comment argues that Robinson’s rejection of Allison’s unduly 
stringent requirements places civil rights back on the right track and 
provides the federal courts with a more judicially-manageable framework 
for resolving the disputed issues. Robinson is the right legal track to 
follow because it is more faithful to the text of Rule 23(b)(2) and the 
advisory committee note. This fidelity results in a workable test allowing 
courts to weigh the relative value of the requested monetary and 
equitable relief. Enabled to objectively valuate the requested relief, the 
Robinson test preserves judicial discretion to certify Rule 23(b)(2) 
classes. The Robinson test also creates judicial economy and maintains 
the doors of the federal judiciary open to adjudicate Title VII claims. 
Given these important jurisprudential considerations, courts should 
follow Robinson over Allison when faced with certification of a robust 
Rule 23(b)(2) class seeking a full range of remedies. 
Part II of this Comment examines the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 
individual and class adjudication of Title VII litigation, the 1991 Civil 
 
 1. 267 F.3d 147 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 2. 151 F.3d 402 (5th Cir. 1998). 
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Rights Amendments, and the mechanics of Rule 23. Part III summarizes 
the Allison opinion. Part IV examines the procedural history, facts, and 
reasoning of Robinson in detail. Part V contrasts the two decisions and 
provides a broad outline of the analytic and judicial considerations 
favoring the Robinson track of analysis as better precedent. Part VI 
analyzes in detail how the Robinson and Allison tests stack up to the text 
of Rule 23 and the implications of their differing tests for monetary 
predominance in certifying a Rule 23(b)(2) class. Part VII explores the 
legitimacy of bifurcating Title VII class litigation and the conflicting 
views of Robinson and Allison.  Part VIII provides empirical evidence 
that the Allison test is preventing effective enforcement of Title VII by 
private litigation, suggesting that the Robinson test better reflects 
congressional intent. Part IX briefly outlines the jurisprudential 
considerations supporting the adoption of Robinson’s analysis and 
concludes by urging courts to leave Allison behind and follow the 
Robinson analytical track. 
II.  THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACTS AND TITLE VII LITIGATION 
A.  The 1964 Civil Rights Act 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employment 
discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin.3 The majority of Title VII enforcement is through private 
litigation, and a significant number of those suits are class actions.4 
Initially only injunctive, declarative, and equitable remedies were 
available to victims of discrimination.5 
 
 3. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000). 
 4. See, e.g., Amchem. Prods. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 614 (1997) (“Civil rights cases 
against parties charged with unlawful, class-based discrimination are prime examples” of the use of 
Rule 23(b)(2).); Jefferson v. Ingersoll Int’l Inc., 195 F. 3d 894, 896 (7th Cir. 1999) (“For many years 
Rule 23(b)(2) was the normal basis of certification in Title VII pattern-or-practice cases.”). The 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) also has an enforcement role, but it brings far 
fewer numbers of cases and is not subject to the constraints of Rule 23. See generally, General Tel. 
Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318 (1980). 
 5. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (2000). These remedies include 
a commitment by the respondent to cease engaging in the unlawful discrimination; the 
posting of notices alerting all respondent’s employees of their right to be free of 
discrimination; corrective or preventive action designed to ensure that similar violations 
will not recur; nondiscriminatory placement of each identified victim; expungement of 
negative comments or adverse actions from employee’s records; back pay for each 
identified victim; and attorney’s fees. 
2 EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, COMPLIANCE MANUAL, THEORIES OF 
DISCRIMINATION VOLUME § 604, no. 915.002 (July 14, 1992). After some debate among the circuit 
courts, front pay was an additional equitable remedy made available to Title VII discrimination 
victims. Front pay takes the place of employee reinstatement when reinstatement is not possible due 
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In order to qualify for relief, plaintiffs must prove either a disparate 
impact or disparate treatment theory of discrimination. Disparate 
treatment involves intentional discrimination by the employer.6 However, 
due to the difficulty of proving an intentional motive, plaintiffs can also 
show discrimination where similarly situated individuals receive 
different treatment.7 Disparate treatment is proved when a member of a 
protected group, who is qualified for a vacant position, is denied 
employment and “the employer continue[s] thereafter to seek applicants 
from persons of complainant’s qualifications.”8 Disparate impact results 
from the use of a facially-neutral, non-intentional employment practice, 
such as requiring a high school diploma, which nevertheless produces a 
statistically significant and disproportionate effect on the protected 
class.9 
Alternatively, rather than pursuing a claim on an individual basis, 
plaintiffs may seek to become class representatives and bring a Title VII 
class action, generally known as a “pattern or practice” suit.10 This two 
phase procedure was approved by the Supreme Court in International 
Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States.11 “Pattern or practice” class 
actions are certified under Rule 23(b)(2) and are tried first in a 
preliminary liability phase. Only if discriminatory liability is found 
during the liability phase does a remedial damages phase begin.12 During 
the first, or liability, phase, plaintiff’s burden of proof must establish the 
employer’s use of discrimination as a “standard operating procedure.”13 
This burden is proved through the use of anecdotal (i.e., class 
representative testimony) and statistical evidence (i.e., from the class as a 
whole).14 If the employer is unable to rebut the evidence, the court will 
conclude the existence of a discriminatory employment practice, order 
class-wide injunctive and declaratory relief, and give a rebuttable 
presumption of liability to each individual class member during the 
second phase.15 
 
to continued employee-employer hostility. See Pollard v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 532 U.S. 
843, 846 (2001). 
 6. McDonald Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
 7. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977). 
 8. McDonald Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802. 
 9. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (overruled by statute on other grounds). 
 10. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 329. 
 11. 431 U.S. 324 (1977). For an explicit description of the two phases, see EEOC v. 
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 960 F. Supp. 203, 205 (E.D. Mo. 1996). 
 12. Id. at 329. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. at 336-37. 
 15. Id. at 361. 
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Phase two, the remedial stage, adjudicates individual damage claims, 
such as back pay and reinstatement. During the remedial stage, plaintiffs 
must prove they suffered an adverse employment action that resulted in 
an economic loss.16 Defendant employers avoid individual liability only 
if they can prove the adverse employment action was motivated by 
“lawful reasons.”17 
B.  The 1991 Civil Rights Amendments 
Congress passed the 1991 Civil Rights Amendments “to provide 
appropriate remedies for intentional discrimination . . . and [expand] the 
scope of relevant civil rights statutes in order to provide adequate 
protection to victims of discrimination.”18 Congress maintained and 
expanded civil rights in the 1991 amendments in a variety of ways. In 
cases of intentional discrimination, Congress determined that both 
compensatory and punitive damages were appropriate remedies.19 
Congress also provided both parties with the right to trial by jury.20 
Additionally, Congress legislatively overruled several earlier Supreme 
Court decisions that severely limited the scope and application of Title 
VII.21 These changes reflect continued congressional reliance upon 
private litigation to enforce Title VII’s provisions.22 Specifically, 
Congress assumed that class actions would continue to be certified after 
 
 16. Id. at 361-62. 
 17. Id. at 362. 
 18. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, §3, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991). 
 19. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (2000). A “damage cap” was placed on the total amount of 
compensatory and punitive damages available, based on the size of the employer and ranging from 
$50,000 to $300,000. Id. § 1981a(b)(3). 
 20. Id. § 1981a(c). 
 21. The 1991 Act modified or overruled eight previous Supreme Court decisions. Section 
101 responds to Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989). Section 105 responds 
explicitly to Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989). Section 107 responds to Price 
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). Section 108 responds to Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 
(1989). Section 109 responds to EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991). Section 
112 responds to Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, Inc., 490 U.S. 900 (1989). Section 113 responds to 
W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83 (1991). Section 114 responds to Library of Congress 
v. Shaw, 478 U.S. 310 (1986). Significantly, the Teamsters opinion, setting forth the procedures for 
Title VII pattern or practice suits, was not addressed by the Act. See Susan E. Stokes, et al., Title VII 
Class Actions after Allison v. Citgo Petroleum, Inc. 19 ABA Annual 5 n.6 (1999), available at 
http://www.bna.com/bnabooks/ ababna/annual/99/annual19.pdf. (demonstrating (1) statutory 
language overriding the Wilks Court mirrored the language and structure of Rule 23; (2) committee 
reports referencing successful class actions as a model for future enforcement; and (3) objections 
that compensatory and punitive damages would now be available to class plaintiffs claiming 
discrimination under the 1991 amendments). 
 22. The House Report for the 1991 Act provides that compensatory and punitive damages 
were included to “encourage citizens to act as private attorneys general.” H.R. REP. NO. 102-40(I), at 
65 (1991). 
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the 1991 amendments.23 Together, these changes demonstrate that the 
1991 Act was intended to expand, not curtail or limit, the use of class 
actions to enforce civil rights.24 
C.  Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23—Class Actions 
When one individual from a protected class has been discriminated 
against, similar discrimination against other individuals from that same, 
or another, protected class frequently occurs. Traditionally, Title VII 
employment discrimination suits have been brought as employment class 
actions under Rule 23. However, discrimination itself does not create a 
presumption of class action suitability, and the proposed class must meet 
the four universal elements required by Rule 23(a) and conform to at 
least one of the four types of class actions created by Rule 23(b).25 
Rule 23(a) requires that a proposed class satisfy the elements of 
numerosity, typicality, commonality, and adequacy of representation.26 
Rule 23(b) creates four types of class actions  and a class must fulfill the 
requirements of either Rule 23(b)(1), (b)(2) or (b)(3) before qualifying 
for certification. A Rule 23(b)(1) “prejudice” class occurs when 
resolving the dispute through individual litigation would result in a race 
to the courthouse where the first case to be decided would effectively 
decide all other subsequent lawsuits on the same matter.27 Similarly, a 
Rule 23(b)(1) “limited fund” class generally occurs when the defendant 
has insufficient assets to pay potential legal liabilities of all potential 
plaintiffs.28 A Rule 23(b)(2) “injunctive” class allows certification where 
plaintiffs suffer substantially the same injuries from defendants’ 
allegedly illegal treatment.29 
A Rule 23(b)(3) “damage” class was created to allow certification of 
negative value lawsuits that would otherwise never be adjudicated on an 
 
 23. See supra note 22. 
 24. See, e.g., Roger Clegg, A Brief Legislative History of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 54 LA. 
L. REV. 1459, 1459-71 (1994). Additionally, if the 1991 Congress had intended to change the then 
current practice of certifying Title VII litigation under Rule 23(b)(2), it could have modified the 
Teamsters decision at the same time as it modified the Wards Cove and Wilks decisions. 
 25. See Gen. Tel. Co. of S.W. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147 (1982). 
 26. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). 
 27. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1). The text allows certification of a “prejudice” class where 
separate, individual suits would create “inconsistent or varying adjudications . . . which would 
establish incompatible standards of conduct” or when adjudications on the individual cases “would 
as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the 
adjudication.” Id. 
 28. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1). 
 29. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2). The text allows certification of an “injunctive relief” class where 
the defendant “has acted . . . on grounds generally applicable to the class,” and the plaintiffs seek 
final injunctive or equitable relief that the court can impose “with respect to the class as a whole.” Id. 
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individual basis.30 In the case of a negative value suit, the denial of class 
certification usually spells the end of all litigation, both class and 
individual.31 Unlike other classes, a Rule 23(b)(3) damage class requires 
predominance32 and superiority33 elements in addition to notice & opt-
out procedures34 before certification is proper. Alternatively, the 
predominance and superiority requirements of a 23(b)(3) class can also 
be met through certification of “issue-specific” classes dealing only with 
issues common to the class as a whole and leaving non-common issues 
for individual adjudication.35 
The trial court makes the initial certification decision.36 Historically, 
the trial court has broad discretion on the appropriateness of class 
certification due to the fact specific nature of the inquiry.37 However, 
Rule 23(f) now allows for appellate review immediately after the trial 
court’s initial certification decision.38 On appeal, the denial of 
 
 30. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 809 (1985) 
(“Class actions . . . permit the plaintiffs to pool claims which would be uneconomical to litigate 
individually.”). A negative value suit occurs when the value of a claim is too small to cover the 
transaction costs associated with any “meaningful individual enforcement of even well-established, 
meritorious claims.” Samuel Issacharoff, Preclusion, Due Process, and the Right to Opt Out of Class 
Actions, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1057, 1059 (2002). 
 31. See, e.g., Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 470-71 (1978) (recognizing that 
the denial of class certification “may induce a plaintiff to abandon his individual claim”). 
 32. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). The predominance element requires the “questions of law or fact 
common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual 
members.” Id. 
 33. Id. The superiority element requires that a class action “is superior to other available 
methods” of adjudicating the suit. Courts determine superiority by weighing the following four 
factors: (1) “the interest of members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution or 
defense of separate actions”; (2) “the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy 
already commenced by or against members of the class”; (3) “the desirability or undesirability of 
concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum”; and (4) “the difficulties likely to 
be encountered in the management of a class action.” Id. See Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 
521 U.S. 591, 618 (1997). 
 34. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2). Notice and opt-out procedures are required in order to give 
absent class members an opportunity to escape the res judicata effects of litigation under Rule 
23(b)(3). Id. In contrast, neither a 23(b)(1) nor a 23(b)(2) class requires notice and opt-out 
procedures because of the cohesive interest of the entire class in the litigation outcome. See Johnson 
v. Gen. Motors Corp., 598 F.2d 432, 437 (5th Cir. 1979); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)-(2). 
However, if the cohesive interest falters, courts may order notice and opt-out procedures to protect 
the due process rights of class members. Johnson, 598 F.2d at 438. See also Kyriazi v. W. Elec. Co., 
647 F.2d 388, 392-95 (3d Cir. 1981). 
 35. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(4). The certification of an issue-specific class, as with all classes, is 
further subject to the court’s power to modify or rescind the class certification if the class proves 
unmanageable or if discovery creates additional issues that are best adjudicated on an individual 
basis. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(d)(4) 
 36. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1). 
 37. Sirota v. Solitron Devices, Inc., 673 F.2d 566, 570-72 (2d Cir. 1982). 
 38. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f). Rule 23 was amended in 2000 to allow for appeals without the need 
for a mandamus order or other procedure. Id. 
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certification is reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard due to the 
highly factual nature of the court’s initial determination.39 
III.  ALLISON V. CITGO PETROLEUM CORP., AND THE 1991 CIVIL RIGHTS 
AMENDMENTS 
A.  Facts 
In Allison v. Citgo, over 130 named plaintiffs sought to become class 
representatives on behalf of a putative class of more than one thousand 
potential members.40 They brought suit pursuant to Title VII for 
allegedly discriminatory employment practices related to hiring, training, 
compensation and promotion policies.41 The district court denied class 
certification and the Allison court affirmed the denial of class 
certification in a 2-1 decision.42 In denying class certification, the Allison 
court specifically noted, “Before the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 
1991 . . . aspects of this case clearly would have qualified for class 
certification.”43 
Applying the terms of the 1991 Act to the requirements of Rule 23, 
the Allison court found that class certification was inappropriate under 
23(b)(2), 23(b)(3), or a bifurcated 23(b)(2) liability phase with a 23(b)(3) 
remedial phase trial because of three distinct problems: (1) the 
inappropriate predominant nature of monetary remedies in a 23(b)(2) 
class; (2) the superiority of individual trials to a 23(b)(3) class where 
individualized monetary damages are sought; and (3) Seventh 
Amendment concerns about the existence of common issues between the 
equitable and legal claims.44 
B.  Allison’s Analysis45 
Allison’s first problem with 23(b)(2) certification involved whether 
the monetary relief requested was incidental or predominant. Noting that 
the plain language of Rule 23(b)(2) is silent as to the availability of 
monetary damages in a 23(b)(2) class, Allison turned to the advisory 
committee notes on Rule 23 stating that a 23(b)(2) class “does not extend 
 
 39. Sirota, 673 F.2d at 570-72; Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., 782 F.2d 468, 471-72 (5th Cir. 
1986). 
 40. 151 F.3d 402, 407 (5th Cir. 1998). 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 408-09. See infra discussion notes 59-61. 
 45. Rather than include an analysis of the dissenting opinion in Allison, relevant portions of 
Judge Dennis’ dissent are brought up in Part IV and V to support the Robinson test. 
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to cases in which the appropriate final relief relates exclusively or 
predominantly to money damages.”46 From this language, the court 
presumed that monetary relief predominates in a 23(b)(2) class unless it 
is “incidental to requested injunctive or declaratory relief.”47 The court 
defined incidental monetary relief as “damages that flow directly from 
liability to the class as a whole on the claims forming the basis of . . . 
relief.”48 Further, incidental monetary relief (1) would be “capable of 
computation by means of objective standards,” (2) would “not require 
additional hearings to resolve the disparate merits of each individual’s 
case,” or (3) “entail complex individualized determinations.”49 Applying 
this test to the proposed class, the court determined that the 
compensatory and punitive damages sought required “specific 
individualized proof,” could not be “calculated by objective standards,” 
and were “clearly . . . not incidental to class-wide injunctive or 
declaratory relief.”50 In sum, the Allison court de facto precludes the 
certification of nearly all (b)(2) classes that seek monetary relief. 
The Allison court also found that the proposed class failed to meet 
the superiority and predominance requirements for certification under 
23(b)(3). The predominance test could not be met because the 
compensatory and punitive damages claims, as discussed above, required 
“individualized and independent proof of injury” in addition to “the 
means by which discrimination was inflicted” regarding each class 
member.51 This requirement, with a “focus almost entirely on facts and 
issues specific to individuals rather than the class as a whole” would 
destroy the efficiency of a class proceeding and turn it “into multiple 
lawsuits separately tried.”52 
Similarly, the superiority element could not be met because 
“individual-specific issues” would decrease the efficiency of the class, 
create “manageability problems” with a jury trial with thousands of 
potential plaintiffs, and create the potential need for multiple juries 
which could “introduc[e] potential Seventh Amendment problems.”53 
Given the 1991 Act’s provision for monetary damages and attorney’s 
fees, individuals already had sufficient incentive to file their own 
 
 46. FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee notes. 
 47. Allison, 151 F.3d at 415. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 417. 
 51. Id. at 419. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 419-20. 
STAMPS - MACRO FINAL 4/30/2003  5:30 PM 
411] TITLE VII 419 
individual suits and did not need class certification to overcome the 
possibility of a negative value suit.54 
Finally, the Allison majority ruled that a bifurcated proceeding, with 
a 23(b)(2) or 23(b)(3) class certified only for the liability phase would 
either waste judicial resources or violate the right to jury trial provided 
by the Seventh Amendment and the 1991 Act. The plaintiffs requested 
certification “on the disparate impact claim and the first stage of the 
pattern or practice claim.”55 The court rejected the requests for two 
reasons. First, the court determined that certifying the pattern or practice 
claim would not “increase the likelihood that latter certification of the 
second stage . . . would be possible” and that without this the district 
court lacked any grounds to certify the class.56 Second, Fifth Circuit 
precedent prohibited an end-run around the predominance requirement of 
23(b)(3) by temporarily “sever[ing] issues until the remaining common 
issue predominates over the remaining individual issues” through the use 
of Rule 23(c)(4).57 
Having rejected certification of the pattern and practice claim, the 
Allison court finally considered the possibility of partial class 
certification for the adverse impact claim.58 However, this course was 
rejected because the Allison court found that the right to a jury trial had 
attached to the pattern or practice claim, and hence to “all factual issues 
necessary to resolving that claim.”59 Therefore, because both claims 
involved the existence of common factual issues, the certification of an 
adverse impact class would result in factual issues being tried by the 
court prior to a jury determination and would therefore run “afoul of the 
Seventh Amendment.”60 The Allison court’s analysis dominated the 
opinions of other federal courts and effectively foreclosed class 
enforcement of Title VII until the Second Circuit’s rejection of Allison in 
2001.61 
 
 54. Id. See supra text and discussion accompanying notes 30-31. 
 55. Allison, 151 F.3d at 420. 
 56. Id. at 421. 
 57. Id. at 422. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 423. 
 60. Id. at 425. 
 61. Three circuits have explicitly adopted the Allison (b)(2) test while a fourth is wavering. 
Jefferson v. Ingersoll Int’l, Inc., 195 F.3d 894 (7th Cir. 1999) (adopting Allison’s (b)(2) 
predominance test); Lemon v. Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs, 216 F.3d 577 (7th Cir. 2000) (re-
affirming Allison’s (b)(2) test but allowing consideration of bifurcated proceedings); Barabin v. 
Aramark Corp., 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 3532 (3d Cir. 2003) (adopting Allison’s (b)(2) test in Title 
VII discrimination suit); Rutstein v. Avis Rent-a-Car Sys., Inc., 211 F.3d 1228 (11th Cir. 2000) 
(adopting Allison’s (b)(2) test in §1981 discrimination suit). But cf. Molski v. Gleich, 307 F.3d 1155 
(9th Cir 2002), opinion withdrawn, Molski v. Gleich, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 2055 (9th Cir. Feb. 6, 
2003). The following circuit courts have all followed the Allison (b)(2) test: Reap v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 
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IV.  ROBINSON V. METRO NORTH COMMUTER RAILROAD 
A.  Facts and Procedural History 
In 1997, twenty-five current and former employees of Metro-North 
Commuter Railroad sought class certification under Rule 23(b)(2) of a 
Title VII employment discrimination claim against their employer.62 
They charged that Metro-North “engage[d] in company-wide 
discriminatory practices,” i.e. a pattern or practice suit.63 The plaintiffs 
were African-Americans seeking to certify a proposed class of “all 
African-American employees of Metro-North Commuter Railroad from 
1983 to 1996” who were either lower-management or unionized 
workers.64 District Judge Rakoff denied the motion for class certification 
after extensive discovery because plaintiffs “failed to carry their burden” 
on “both the commonality and the typicality” elements of Rule 23(a).65 
Subsequently, Judge Rakoff granted summary judgment dismissing 
the claims of nine of the plaintiffs, leaving only four plaintiffs in the 
suit.66 Class plaintiffs then appealed the denial of class certification and 
the Second Circuit reversed and remanded for further proceedings.67 
Judge Newman of the Second Circuit found that the district court, in its 
denial of class certification, had committed a reversible error by 
considering “the merits of the claims of the purported class,” which is 
inappropriate at the certification stage.68 Judge Newman also found that 
the plaintiffs had met the requirements of Rule 23(a) and ordered the 
district court to consider the requirements of Rule 23(b) on remand.69 
Upon remand, Judge Rakoff considered plaintiffs’ renewed motion 
for class certification for trial on bifurcated liability and damages.70 The 
court, relying primarily upon, and quoting extensively from, the Allison 
decision, determined that 23(b)(2) certification was inappropriate 
because of the need for “individualized proof and proceedings to 
 
199 F.R.D. 536 (D.N.J. 2001); Ramirez v. DeCoster, 194 F.R.D. 348 (D. Me. 2000); Rineheart v. 
Ciba-Geigy Corp., 183 F.R.D. 497 (M.D. La. 1998); Sibley v. Diversified Collection Svcs., Inc., 
1998 WL 355492 (N.D. Tex. June 30, 1998). 
 62. Robinson v. Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co., 175 F.R.D. 46 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). 
 63. Id. at 46-47. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Robinson v. Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co., 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 373, *2 (S.D.N.Y. 
Jan. 15, 1998). The claims of the other initial plaintiffs were withdrawn prior to this judgment. Id. at 
2 n.1. 
 67. Caridad v. Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co., 191 F.3d 283, 296 (2d Cir. 1999). 
 68. Id. at 293. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Robinson v. Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co., 197 F.R.D. 85 (S.D.N.Y 2000). 
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determine . . . what individualized damages were appropriate.”71 Such 
individualized proceedings would “overwhelm” either the liability or 
damages phase and “make class action treatment inappropriate under 
Rule 23(b)(2).”72 For similar reasons, the court determined that 23(b)(3) 
certification was not possible because “questions of fact affecting 
individual members of the class” predominated over any common 
questions.73 The superiority element also could not be met because of the 
individual plaintiffs’ interest in controlling prosecution of the case, 
doubts about the adequacy of the class representatives, the localized 
nature of the dispute within New York, and the challenges of 
“management of a class action” with highly individualized factors.74 
Given these findings, the court dismissed the case with prejudice.75 
B.  Robinson Ruling Redux 
On appeal for the second time, the Second Circuit, in a 3-0 decision, 
vacated the district court’s order dismissing the case and ordered the 
court to certify a disparate impact class under 23(b)(2).76 The panel also 
ordered the district court to consider whether the pattern or practice 
claim should be certified as a 23(b)(2) class or bifurcated to allow 
certification of the liability stage of the pattern or practice claim.77 The 
Second Circuit reached this decision after deciding that the trial court 
had abused its discretion by applying the wrong legal test in determining 
the appropriateness of class certification.78 Chief Judge Walker held that 
the Allison “incidental” test was the incorrect legal standard to apply, that 
the refusal to bifurcate the pattern or practice claim was an abuse of 
discretion, that a disparate impact class would not violate the Seventh 
Amendment, and that consideration of class plaintiffs’ adequacy as 
representatives was inappropriate.79 
1.  Incidental test 
In a case of first instance in the Second Circuit, the Robinson panel 
refused to adopt the Allison “incidental” test for determining the 
 
 71. Id. at 88. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 89. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 90. 
 76. Robinson v. Metro-North Commuter R.R Co., 267 F.3d 147 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 167. 
 79. Id. The first three holdings are discussed in detail in this Comment, while the adequacy of 
the plaintiff class is outside the scope of this Comment. 
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feasibility of certifying a 23(b)(2) class that seeks monetary, in addition 
to equitable, relief.80 The court held that the Allison “incidental” test 
effectively “forecloses 23(b)(2) class certification of all claims that 
include compensatory damages (or punitive damages).”81 Rather than 
adopt this “bright-line bar to 23(b)(2) class treatment of all claims” for 
monetary damages, the Robinson court created an “ad hoc” or 
“balancing” test to determine the appropriateness of 23(b)(2) 
certification.82 
The balancing test essentially adopted the holding of the Allison 
dissent, that the totality of the remedies sought should be weighed, 
considering whether “the positive weight or value [to plaintiffs] of the 
injunctive or declaratory relief sought is predominant” and whether 
“class treatment would be efficient and manageable, thereby achieving 
an appreciable measure of judicial economy.”83 However, the Robinson 
court added two additional elements for plaintiffs to meet in order to 
certify a mixed remedy 23(b)(2) class. First, “reasonable plaintiffs would 
bring the suit to obtain the injunctive or declaratory relief sought.”84 
Second, “the injunctive or declaratory relief sought would be both 
reasonably necessary and appropriate were the plaintiffs to succeed on 
the merits.”These two requirements effectively ferret out “sham requests 
for injunctive relief” that predominantly seek monetary relief.85 
The court reasoned that a balancing approach was preferable to the 
bright-line Allison prohibition because it restores district court discretion, 
achieves greater judicial efficiency, and “ensur[es] due process for absent 
class members.”86 First, Rule 23 vests the decision of whether to grant or 
deny class certification in the district court.87 The Second Circuit, turning 
to precedent and the leading treatise on class actions, was persuaded that 
“[n]o clear standards have been or could be developed” in light of 
legislatively granted judicial discretion.88 Second, judicial efficiency is 
better served by “permitting district courts to assess issues . . . on a case-
by-case basis . . . [rather than] the one-size-fits all approach of the 
[Allison] incidental damages standard.”89 Third, the due process concerns 
 
 80. Id. at 164. 
 81. Id. at 163. 
 82. Id. at 164. 
 83. Id. (quoting Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 430 (5th Cir. 1998) (Dennis 
J., dissenting)). 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 165. 
 87. FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
 88. Robinson, 267 F.3d at 165. (quoting 1 HERBERT B. NEWBERG & ALBA CONTE, NEWBERG 
ON CLASS ACTIONS § 4.14 at 48-49 (3d 1992)). 
 89. Id. 
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that led the Allison court to adopt a bright-line prohibition are absent 
when “the district court simply afford[s] notice and opt out rights to 
absent class members . . . for the damages phase of the proceedings.”90 In 
the absence of due process concerns, the Robinson court held that “the 
interests of the class members [remain] essentially identical” and are 
“ensured by adequate representation alone” at the liability phase of class 
proceedings, and thus and make 23(b)(2) certification appropriate.91 
2.  Bifurcated proceedings 
Next, the Robinson panel considered the district court’s denial of 
class certification of a liability phase only pattern or practice claim. In 
finding that the district court erred in not certifying a liability class, the 
Robinson court turned to Rule 23(c)(4), which allows “an action [to] be 
brought or maintained as a class action with respect to particular 
issues.”92 This Rule has been interpreted to mean that the use of 
bifurcated trials should be maximized in district courts in order to 
conserve “judicial resources.”93 The court agreed with commentators that 
“class action[s] should not be found unmanageable without exploring . . . 
bifurcating liability and damages.”94 The court found that a liability-only 
class would “promote judicial economy” and decrease the “range of 
issues in dispute” because it would establish whether the plaintiffs’ class 
should receive prospective relief, a presumption of liability for each 
individual employee, and whether or not a damages phase would even be 
needed.95 
3.  Seventh Amendment issues96 
The Robinson court also ordered the district court to certify a 
disparate impact 23(b)(2) class. The district court had not done so 
because of potential problems with the Seventh Amendment that could 
 
 90. Id. at 166. 
 91. Id. at 166 n.10. 
 92. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(4). 
 93. Cent. Wesleyan Coll. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 6 F.3d 177, 185 (4th Cir. 1993). 
 94. Robinson, 267 F.3d at 168 (quoting Edward F. Sherman, Class Actions and Duplicative 
Litigation, 62 IND. L.J. 507, 516 (1987)). 
 95. Id. The court also corrected the district court’s misunderstanding regarding the role of 
anecdotal evidence as “texture” to the “statistical evidence directed at establishing an overall pattern 
or practice of intentional discrimination.” Id. at 168. 
 96. While the Seventh Amendment problem is discussed here as an important part of the 
Robinson decision, it will not be analyzed as it is out of the scope of this Comment. The Seventh 
Amendment problem deals primarily with procedural problems arising from certifying a disparate 
impact class. This paper focuses solely upon the appropriateness of bringing a pattern or practice 
discrimination claim under Rule 23(b)(2) and/or 23(b)(3). 
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arise if the disparate impact claim were tried first. However, the 
Robinson court noted that this problem was obviated by plaintiffs’ 
“opportunity to proceed to a jury trial first on the liability phase of the 
pattern-or-practice claim.”97 If the plaintiffs were successful, the 
disparate impact trial could be delayed until after the remedial phase of 
the pattern or practice claim, thereby preventing “any overlapping factual 
issues between the two claims” because they would have been first tried 
by the pattern or practice jury.98 Alternatively, if defendants were 
successful after the liability phase, the disparate impact judge could rely 
upon “answers to special interrogatories from the pattern or practice jury 
for any overlapping common factual issues.”99 
V.  ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK: WHY ROBINSON IS A BETTER LINE OF 
LEGAL REASONING TO FOLLOW THAN ALLISON 
While circuit court splits initially create confusion about the state of 
the law, the Robinson court’s rejection of Allison actually clears up a 
substantial amount of confusion caused by the Allison decision. The 
Allison court’s “incidental” bright-line test of monetary predominance in 
a Rule 23(b)(2) action has two fundamental flaws. First, it 
misapprehends both the purpose and text of 23(b)(2). Second, it 
impermissibly usurps the trial court’s legislatively vested discretion in 
making class certification decisions. Robinson corrects the confusion 
caused by these two errors by creating a balancing test that adheres 
closely to the purposes of Rule 23(b)(2) actions and preserves the role of 
the trial court in evaluating class certification motions. 
Allison created further judicial confusion by refusing to bifurcate the 
proceedings and certify a liability-only class under Rule 23(b)(2) or 
23(b)(3). Analytically, the Allison court’s decision denying bifurcation 
was based upon an overly broad reading of Castano v. American 
Tobacco Co.,100 a complete misreading of Cooper v. Federal Reserve 
Bank of Richmond,101 and the unnecessary implication of only potential 
Seventh Amendment and due process concerns. Robinson corrects this 
by pointing out how proper use of Rule 23(c)(4) can be used to bifurcate 
class issues and achieve judicial economy.102 
Additionally, Allison condemned the judiciary to adjudicate all Title 
VII claims seeking monetary damages by individual trials. Practically, 
 
 97. Robinson, 267 F.3d at 170. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996). 
 101. 467 U.S. 867 (1984). See infra notes 188-93. 
 102. Robinson, 267 F.3d at 167-69. 
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the requirement of individual non-class adjudication effectively denies 
Title VII plaintiffs access to the federal court system designed to protect 
their rights and eviscerates civil rights enforcement. Despite the 
availability of compensatory and punitive damages, individual plaintiffs 
still face the negative value dilemma. This result is clearly at odds with 
the express intent of Congress when it passed the 1991 Act to expand 
and increase the scope of remedies available to discrimination victims. 
Robinson corrects this by actively engaging Allison’s potential 
constitutional problems and avoiding them by using existing procedures 
and crafting new procedures. Robinson’s analysis safeguards 
constitutional rights without sacrificing effective civil rights 
enforcement. 
VI.  SUPERIORITY OF ROBINSON’S RULE 23(B)(2) BALANCING TEST VS. 
ALLISON’S BRIGHT LINE RULE 
The Robinson court adopted an “ad hoc” or balancing test for the 
Second Circuit rather than adopting the Allison court’s bright-line test to 
decide whether monetary relief predominates in a 23(b)(2) class.103 The 
balancing approach is superior to a bright-line test for several reasons.  
First, it adheres to the unambiguous plain meaning established by the text 
of Rule 23(b)(2) which Allison ignores. Second, the advisory committee 
note on Rule 23(b)(2) clearly calls for a relationship test that weighs the 
requested injunctive or declarative relief with the requested monetary 
relief. Allison abandons the committee’s call in favor of a test that 
evaluates the procedures required to adjudicate and order the relief 
requested. In contrast, Robinson confronts the committee note’s task 
directly and creates a balancing test to weight the relationship between 
the monetary and injunctive or declarative relief requested. Third, the 
Allison test for the predominance of monetary relief in a Rule 23(b)(2) 
suit attempts to re-write the (b)(2) class in the image of Rule 23(b)(3). 
Allison thereby effectively creates a “monetary damages” firewall that 
protects litigant’s due process rights while simultaneously denying these 
same litigants the opportunity to bring their Title VII claims in a Rule 
23(b)(2) class. In contrast, the Robinson test, by focusing on the textual 
requirements of the Rule, recognizes that existing Rule 23 procedures 
effectively ensure due process without creating an overly broad test. 
Finally, the Robinson test preserves judicial discretion over class 
certification. In contrast, Allison creates an extra-textual test that 
effectively strips district courts of their discretion to certify a Rule 
23(b)(2) class that seeks monetary damages provided for by the 1991 
 
 103. Robinson v. Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co., 267 F.3d 147, 162-64 (2d Cir. 2001). 
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amendments. These four considerations indicate that the Robinson 
court’s balancing test is a superior indication of when a Rule 23(b)(2) 
class seeking a full range of Title VII remedies should be certified. 
A.  Rule 23(b)(2)’s Minimal Textual Requirements and Plain Meaning 
The text of Rule 23(b)(2) establishes a two-prong test for 
certification. The first prong requires that the defendant “has acted . . . on 
grounds generally applicable to the class.” 104 The second prong requires 
that plaintiffs seek “final injunctive or equitable relief with respect to the 
class as a whole.”105 The first prong is met when an employment practice 
allegedly discriminates in a manner “generally applicable to the class.”106 
The second prong is met when the putative class files for final injunctive 
or declaratory relief from the employment practice on behalf of “the 
class as a whole.”107 
When these two elements have been met, certification should be 
granted because neither the text nor its plain meaning establish any 
further criteria. As a matter of construction, where the text of a statute or 
rule is unambiguous, the text and plain meaning of the text should be 
controlling without resorting to extra-textual sources, such as the 
advisory committee notes, in order to divine legislative intent.108 
Therefore, any class that can meet the textual requirements of Rule 
23(b)(2) should be entitled to at least a presumption of legitimacy. 
However, most courts have eschewed this approach, finding the text of 
the Rule ambiguous, and relying upon the 1966 advisory committee note 
on Rule 23(b)(2) for guidance.109 
 
 104. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2). 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. See generally, Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 109. While reliance upon the advisory committee note is well established in precedent, its 
necessity is questionable in the current case. Within the context of the Rule, a strong argument can 
be made that a prospective class that properly meets the two textual requirements of 23(b)(2)is not a 
“sham” suit and should be certified. In order to achieve 23(b)(2) certification, the injunctive or 
declaratory relief must be “final” and “settle the legality” of the action or failure to act. These 
requirements alone might be ruled sufficient, without any need to delve into what “predominant” 
means. An exact definition might not be necessary because without the injunctive or declaratory 
relief, no class is possible. If an action contains a sine qua non, such as injunctive or declaratory 
relief, this relief obviously predominates over any other type of relief sought. As a matter of 
interpretation, where the text of a statute or rule is unambiguous, the plain language and meaning of 
the text should be controlling without resorting to legislative history in order to divine legislative 
intent. See generally id. Here, because the text of the rule is silent regarding whether or not other 
forms of relief, in addition to injunctive or declaratory, are available to a 23(b)(2) class, their 
inclusion should not be read so as to change the explicit textual requirements for certification. 
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B.  Advisory Committee Notes: The Scope of Rule 23(b)(2) 
The 23(b)(2) class was specifically created in order to allow the 
adjudication of civil rights class actions under Title VII.110 This 
consideration should shape how both the text of the Rule and the 
advisory committee note for the Rule are interpreted. The advisory 
committee note for Rule 23(b)(2) contains one statement that supports 
the clear meaning of the text and one statement that purports to add an 
additional element for class certification under the Rule. The note first 
states: 
This subdivision is intended to reach situations where a party has taken 
action or refused to take action with respect to a class, and final relief 
of an injunctive nature or of a corresponding declaratory nature, settling 
the legality of the behavior with respect to the class as a whole, is 
appropriate.111 
This initial comment by the 1966 advisory committee mirrors the 
text of Rule 23(b)(2) and makes it abundantly clear that courts should 
focus on whether the injunctive or declaratory relief requested “settl[es] 
the legality of the [employment practice] with respect to the class.”112 
The note indicates that any test should also focus on whether the 
injunctive or declaratory relief requested will force or prevent “action,” 
in this case the discriminatory employment practice, with respect “to the 
class,” not to each individual member of the class.113 If the above quote 
were the only language in the note then the matter would be decided 
based on the two textual requirements of Rule 23(b)(2) alone. This would 
exclude the inclusion of monetary damages as a relevant factor in 
determining class certification. 
However, the advisory committee note also states that 23(b)(2) 
classes do “not extend to cases in which the appropriate final relief 
relates exclusively or predominantly to money damages.”114 The exact 
meaning of this phrase is the focus of the split between the Allison and 
Robinson courts. As discussed above, the Allison test concludes that only 
“incidental” monetary damage claims will not predominate in a 23(b)(2) 
class.115 In contrast, the Robinson court ruled that monetary damage 
 
 110. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2) advisory committee note; 2-14A MOORE’S MANUAL – 
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, §14A.32 (“Rule 23(b)(2) was promulgated essentially as a 
tool for facilitating civil rights actions.”). 
 111. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2) advisory committee note. 
 112. Id. (emphasis added). 
 113. Id. (emphasis added). 
 114. Id. (emphasis added). 
 115. Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 417 (5th Cir. 1998). 
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claims are appropriate in a 23(b)(2) class as long as they do not 
predominate over the requested injunctive or declaratory relief.116 
The text of the committee note itself does not resolve the 
Allison/Robinson split. However, it does provide clear guidance from 
which to evaluate the two courts’ distinct tests. The comment self-
defines appropriate final relief as being of “an injunctive nature or . . . 
declaratory nature.”117 Similarly, the “exclusively” language is self-
defining because the Rule’s text requires that a prospective 23(b)(2) class 
must be seeking appropriate injunctive or declaratory relief. In plain 
meaning, an action “exclusive[ly]” seeking money damages would not 
allow for the inclusion of any other remedy, i.e., the necessary injunction 
or declaration. The inclusion of “exclusive” therefore serves as an 
indicator that “sham” or pre-textual claims for injunctive or declaratory 
relief will not make money damage claims appropriate for 23(b)(2) 
certification.118 
However, this understanding does not answer the question of 
whether money damages may be sought concurrently with appropriate 
claims for injunctive or declaratory relief. However, the note does 
indicate that the proper test to determine if money damages predominate 
is how they “relate[]” to “appropriate” injunctive or declaratory relief.119 
Given the inclusion of the unnecessary “exclusively” language, the 
committee note clearly asks judges to decide whether the relationship 
between the injunctive or declaratory “appropriate final relief” and the 
requested money damages relief is legitimate or whether money damages 
are sought as the predominant form of “final relief” requested.120 
Because the committee note does not define “predominantly,” the next 
section compiles definitions of “predominant” in an attempt to clarify the 
permissible amount of monetary damage claims that would not 
predominate in a Rule 23(b)(2) class. 
C.  Predominant Money Damages: A Relationship Test Comparing Relief 
or Relief Procedures? 
The Allison and Robinson courts each define “predominant” 
differently. The Allison court focuses upon the procedures required for a 
court to order the requested monetary relief vis-à-vis injunctive or 
declaratory relief. The Robinson court’s definition of predominance 
directly compares the types of relief requested. A large variety of 
 
 116. Robinson v. Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co., 267 F.3d 147, 162-64 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 117. Id. 
 118. See In re Sch. Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d 996, 1008 (3d Cir. 1986). 
 119. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2) advisory committee note. 
 120. Id. 
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definitions of “predominant” exist. Therefore, before analyzing the word, 
the following admonition by Justice Douglas is relevant: 
[I]n the English language, each word may have several meanings. 
Often it is the use of a specific word or term upon which a case or 
controversy may hinge. Only by using precise language can the waters 
remain clear and unmuddied allowing justice to take its course 
unfettered by those who would mislead or misrepresent.121 
Justice Douglas’ quote highlights the high stakes involved in defining 
when “the appropriate final relief relates . . . predominantly to money 
damages.”122 Regardless of which test eventually wins out, the lack of a 
specific definition in the mean time has already hindered the course of 
justice in deterring discrimination. 
The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language defines 
predominant as “[h]aving greatest ascendancy, importance, influence, 
authority, or force.”123 This influence “often implies being uppermost at a 
particular time.”124 Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary defines 
predominant as “being most frequent or common.”125 Predominant 
monetary damages must therefore be the most important, the most 
influential, the most frequent or common, or most often requested relief. 
The Allison test appears to favor a “most infludential” definition, 
where the “particular time” used to define this influence is at the 
damages phase of a prospective class’s adjudication.126 Under this 
understanding of “predominant,” the determination of compensatory 
damages for each individual involves the most frequent, common or 
numerous relief in the sense of total time necessary to adjudicate the 
claims.127 It also makes the individualized claims for monetary damages 
the most quantitatively numerous in comparison with the single claim for 
class injunctive and/or declaratory relief.128 Therefore, this definition of 
predominance focuses upon the procedures necessary for relief to be 
granted. 
In contrast, the Robinson test appears to favor a qualitative “most 
influential” test, where two “particular times” are weighed to determine 
the predominance of any monetary claims. The first time is the plaintiffs’ 
 
 121. William O. Douglas, Foreward to WILLIAM C. BURTONS, BURTON’S LEGAL THESAURUS 
vi (3d ed. 1998). 
 122. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2) advisory committee note. See also supra note 46. 
 123. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1383 (4th ed. 2000) 
(emphasis added). 
 124. Id. at 534 (emphasis added). 
 125. MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 918 (10th ed. 1993). 
 126. Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 415 (5th Cir. 1998). 
 127. Id. at 419. 
 128. Id. at 415-19. 
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initial decision to pursue both injunctive or declaratory and monetary 
damages. This test weighs both the comparative “values” of the relief 
sought and whether the suit would be brought in the absence of monetary 
damages.129 The second time is at the granting of any final relief, where 
the “injunctive or declaratory relief sought would be both reasonably 
necessary and appropriate” in the event of a finding for plaintiffs.130 This 
definition of predominance focuses upon the relief itself rather than 
procedural issues or how evidence would be proven in court. 
Both the Allison and Robinson interpretations of predominant are 
reasonable in light of the multiplicity of definitions. As Allison noted, 
“[H]ow [the definition] translates into a workable formula for 
comparing . . . [predominance] is not at all clear.”131 However, each 
court’s relative reliance, or lack thereof, on the advisory committee note 
signals how these two tests, each of which purports to define 
predominant, could reach such significant and substantially different 
results. The Allison court stated “[t]he Advisory Committee Notes [sic] 
make no effort to define or explain” predominantly.132 Instead, they 
looked for guidance from “the principles and assumptions underlying the 
23(b)(2) class and class actions in general.”133 The Allison court thus 
missed the subtle, yet explicit, contextual direction key to defining 
predominantly provided in the advisory committee note. 
As discussed briefly above134, the advisory committee note directs 
courts to focus on the relief requested and whether the relationship 
between the injunctive relief requested and claims for money damages is 
predominantly monetary.135 Earlier, the advisory committee note 
highlighted that “relief of an injunctive or . . . declaratory nature” was 
appropriate, if not absolutely necessary, in a 23(b)(2) action.136 Together, 
this language indicates that the nature of the relief requested, vis-à-vis 
money damages, should be weighed in order to determine whether the 
money damages are more predominant than the injunctive or declaratory 
relief that is properly available in a 23(b)(2) action. 
The result of Allison’s omission is a focus on the procedures for, and 
the potential difficulties of, awarding monetary relief to a 23(b)(2) class 
rather than the monetary relief’s relationship to the requested injunctive 
or declaratory relief. The Allison test is a de facto determination of 
 
 129. Robinson v. Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co., 267 F.3d 147, 164 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 130. Id. 
 131. Allison, 151 F.3d at 412. 
 132. Id. at 411. 
 133. Id. 
 134. See supra notes 118-121. 
 135. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2) advisory committee note. 
 136. Id. 
STAMPS - MACRO FINAL 4/30/2003  5:30 PM 
411] TITLE VII 431 
whether the injunctive or monetary claims would predominate the 
court’s time. However, the advisory committee note does not give any 
indication that the relationship between the court’s time and the 
requested monetary relief is the crucial factor in determining 
predominance. Further, the amount of time it will take during trial to 
establish any given claim for relief should not be dispositive of whether 
that claim will be certified under 23(b)(2). The contrary position is 
tantamount to saying that only claims or defenses that can be made 
within a single day, or even a single hour, are properly brought before 
the courts. Such a suggestion is preposterous on its face.137 
In contrast, the Robinson court’s predominance balancing test 
adheres to the text of the advisory committee note and its call for a 
relationship test. While Robinson does not make a “relief” versus “relief 
procedures” distinction explicitly, it does create a relationship test 
comparing the requested injunctive and declaratory relief against the 
requested monetary relief. This makes the Robinson interpretation of the 
advisory committee’s predominance test relatively simple: Does the 
amount of requested monetary relief predominate the sum of the relief 
requested when compared to the value of the requested injunctive or 
declaratory relief? Therefore, by quantifying the value of injunctive or 
declarative relief requested, the courts have an objective measure of 
whether plaintiffs’ relief is mostly monetary or equitable in nature.138 If 
the total amount of monetary damages sought is greater than the value of 
equitable relief, then class certification is inappropriate under Rule 
23(b)(2) and should instead be sought under Rule 23(b)(3). If however 
the monetary damages are less than the equitable value, the suit may 
proceed as a Rule 23(b)(2) class. Therefore, the Robinson test not only 
arrives at a better textual interpretation of “predominance,” but also one 
that can readily be adjudicated by the courts. 
D.  The Robinson Test Provides a Better Fit in Comparison to the Over-
 
 137. But cf. MCI Communications Corp. v. AT&T Co., 708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1982) 
(affirming a twenty-six day limit on both sides for the presentation of their case in chief). 
 138. Quantifying injunctive and declaratory relief will not present the courts with an unduly 
difficult task. Courts already routinely quantify equitable relief when determining whether the 
amount in controversy has been met for diversity jurisdiction purposes under 28 U.S.C. §1332. See 
Mass. State Pharm. Ass’n v. Federal Prescrip. Serv., 431 F.2d 130, 132 (8th Cir. 1970) (injunctive 
relief action filed originally in federal court). While there is an active debate over the correct 
perspective from which to valuate equitable relief in individual suits, there is no debate about the 
capacity of courts to engage in this equitable valuation analysis. 15 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., 
MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE— CIVIL §102.109 (2001). Further, in the class action context the 
courts all appear to agree that the plaintiff’s perspective is required. See generally Snyder v. Harris, 
394 U.S. 332, 338 (1969); Packard v. Provident Nat’l Bank, 994 F.2d 1039, 1050 (3d Cir. 1993); 
Snow v. Ford Motor Co., 561 F.2d 787, 790 (9th Cir. 1977); 15 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., 
MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE— CIVIL §102.109 (2001). 
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Inclusive Nature of the Allison Test 
The Allison test denies 23(b)(2) certification to any claim for relief 
that does not “flow directly from liability to the class as a whole on the 
claims forming the basis of the injunctive or declaratory relief.”139 This 
result is over inclusive in both form and substance. 
First, neither the text nor the plain meaning of the advisory 
committee note on predominance rules out a 23(b)(2) class that seeks 
monetary relief that is secondary or dependent to injunctive or 
declarative relief. Further, monetary damages are permissible even if 
significant in comparison to injunctive or declarative relief. This 
possibility exists because the text of Rule 23(b)(2), on its face, does not 
require that monetary damages be exclusively incidental or nominal in 
nature. If the Allison court disagreed with the plain language of the text 
of Rule 23(b)(2), it should have noted its dislike and let the parties 
injured by the language seek a congressional amendment rather than 
replacing the text with its own interpretation. In contrast, the Robinson 
court created a test that allows litigants to seek appropriate monetary 
damages. 
Second, the Allison standard is overly stringent and fails to achieve 
judicial economy. To twist the Allison court’s own language, the test is 
over-inclusive because it de facto denies 23(b)(2) certification to all 
classes that seek monetary damages. However, this bright-line rule 
denies litigants the capacity to exercise their statutory rights to 
“compensatory and punitive damages as well as a jury trial” under the 
1991 Civil Rights Act.140 This bar is especially repugnant where, as the 
Allison court openly admitted, previous to 1991 these classes “clearly 
would have qualified for class certification.”141 In contrast, the Robinson 
court found a less restrictive means of protecting litigant procedural 
rights without denying litigants their statutory and civil rights. 
The Robinson court arrived at a workable test by not looking beyond 
the textual mark of the advisory committee note and Rule 23. Robinson 
avoided Allison’s mistaken assumption that the advisory committee note 
was silent regarding the form for a predominance test of money 
damages.142 This mistake led the Allison court to create an incidental test 
of monetary predominance. However, on its face, it is far from clear that 
the three words “incidental,” “predominant,” and “exclusive” create 
either a complete or even an appropriate spectrum for comparing 
 
 139. Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 415 (5th Cir. 1998). 
 140. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (2000). 
 141. Allison, 151 F.3d at 407. 
 142. Id. at 411. 
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monetary damages against injunctive or declaratory relief in a 23(b)(2) 
class.143 
An examination of the plain meaning of “incidental,” compared with 
the definitions of “predominant” examined above, shows that these two 
words are not sufficiently opposed to each other to create a boundary 
between impermissible and appropriate relief in a 23(b)(2) action. While 
“incidental” and “predominant” do not conflict with each other, non-
incidental monetary damages are not necessarily predominant. Non-
incidental monetary relief would not lack effect or influence, but could 
be of either controlling or non-controlling, or in either a numerically 
superior or inferior position in relation to injunctive or declaratory relief. 
The failure of these two terms to meet indicates that an incidental test for 
monetary damages will be over inclusive, excluding non-incidental 
claims for monetary relief that have an effect, but a non-controlling one, 
and are thus not predominant. 
In contrast, the Robinson balancing test focuses on the “weight or 
value” to plaintiffs of the injunctive relief sought in comparison to the 
weight or value of the compensatory damages.144 This assessment 
determines if the plaintiffs will focus primarily upon proving their 
monetary damages to the exclusion or detriment of the injunctive or 
declarative relief. A court therefore asks whether “reasonable plaintiffs” 
would seek the requested injunctive or declaratory relief as a stand alone 
remedy. This question is in turn answered by whether the relief is “both 
reasonably necessary and appropriate.”145 In contrast to the “incidental” 
test, the balancing test does not automatically exclude non-incidental, 
non-predominate monetary relief. The balancing test does allow the court 
sufficient discretion to determine whether the monetary relief sought 
fails a plain meaning test of predominance. In sum, the case by case 
balancing test advocated by the Robinson court is a closer fit to the text 
and plain language of Rule 23 and the advisory committee note than the 
linguistically over-inclusive “incidental” Allison test. 
 
 143. Black’s Law Dictionary defines incidental as “subordinate to something of greater 
importance; having a minor role.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 765 (7th ed. 1999).” In the law of 
damages, incidental means “losses reasonably associated with or related to actual damages.” Id. at 
395. Webster’s Dictionary defines incidental as “occurring merely by chance or without intention or 
calculation” or “lacking effect, force, or consequence: not receiving much consideration or 
intention.” WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, 
UNABRIDGED 1142 (3d 1998). Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary defines predominant as “to 
hold advantage in numbers or quantity” or “to exert controlling power or influence.” MERRIAM-
WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 918 (10th ed. 1993). 
 144. Robinson v. Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co., 267 F.3d 147, 164 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting 
Allison, 151 F.3d at 430). 
 145. Id. 
STAMPS - MACRO FINAL 4/30/2003  5:30 PM 
434 B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume XVII 
E.  Procedural Rights and Judicial Economy in a 23(b)(2) Class 
The Robinson test protects the procedural rights of litigants and 
promotes judicial economy by leaving discretion in the hands of the trial 
judge, rather than imposing the Allison test’s unnecessary, inefficient, 
and activist “incidental” test. Courts should follow the Robinson line of 
reasoning because it better protects the due process rights of litigants and 
promotes judicial economy. 
1.  Notice and opt-out procedures adequately safeguard due process 
rights 
The Allison court’s definition of predominance avoids two problems 
it found in the procedure of awarding money damages to a 23(b)(2) class. 
First, because 23(b)(2) actions are binding on all class members, the 
Allison court defined predominance to include any monetary claim 
suggesting, “the procedural safeguards of notice and opt-out are 
necessary.”146 The court was persuaded that monetary damage claims 
would decrease the presumption of cohesiveness in a 23(b)(2) class. 
Therefore class notice and opt-out procedures, like those required in a 
23(b)(3) class, would be necessary to protect “the individual rights of 
class members.”147 
In contrast, the Robinson court, while acknowledging the procedural 
concerns of Allison, noted that other options existed to “eradicate the due 
process risks posed” by 23(b)(2) monetary damage claims.148 One option 
involves adjudication of whether the presumption of class cohesiveness 
in the injunctive or declaratory relief sought has been compromised and 
overcome by the individual interest in monetary damages. This option 
properly recognizes that the adequacy of representation requirement of 
Rule 23(a) ensures the due process rights of litigants “where the interests 
of the class members are essentially identical.”149 During the initial phase 
of a pattern of practice claim, the presumption of cohesiveness remains 
because the interest of class members is in obtaining the desired 
injunctive or declaratory relief.150 Here, the Robinson court appropriately 
discerns that any disparity in class interests due to monetary damages 
will not arise until after a ruling on the merits of the liability phase of the 
trial. 
 
 146. Allison, 151 F.3d at 413. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Robinson, 267 F.3d at 165 (emphasis added). 
 149. Id. at 166 n.10. 
 150. See id. at 166. 
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Another option invokes the court’s power to “require that an opt-out 
right and notice” be given to class members under Rule 23(d)(2) when 
and if class cohesiveness fails.151 While notice and opt-out rights are only 
required in a 23(b)(3) class, Rule 23(d)(2) allows the court discretion to 
order such procedural safeguards sua sponte, if  necessary, during the 
course of any 23(b)(1), 23(b)(2) or 23(b)(3) proceeding. Also, while not 
specifically noted by the Robinson court during its analysis, a balancing 
test is also supported by the power of the court to modify or decertify a 
class during the course of proceedings if the class fails to maintain the 
requirements for certification, for example, adequacy of representation, 
under Rule 23(d). 
In sum, while the Allison “incidental” test does protect the 
procedural rights of litigants, its reach erects more protection than is 
needed. In fact, Allison may actually infringe on the substantive rights of 
legitimate 23(b)(2) classes that seek a full range of Title VII remedies in 
federal court. At best, this flaw detracts substantially from its superiority 
as a test for predominance. At worst, it sacrifices substantive civil rights 
in the name of protecting against avoidable procedural phantoms. The 
strict Allison test is unnecessary to protect the constitutional due process 
rights of litigants. The Robinson test recognizes the court’s discretionary 
23(d)(2) power to order notice and opt-out procedures for class members 
that ensure litigants their due process rights. This consideration alone 
favors adoption of the Robinson balancing test because it adequately 
protects the procedural and substantive rights of all litigants while 
simultaneously allowing plaintiffs to prosecute Title VII claims in 
defense of their civil rights. 
2.  Judicial economy and discretion 
The second concern of the Allison court centered on the lack of 
23(b)(3) predominance or superiority tests in 23(b)(2) actions, which it 
felt were necessary to protect judicial economy. The Allison court found 
that any 23(b)(2) predominance test must “achieve a significant measure 
of judicial economy,” which could best be promoted by “concentrating 
the litigation on common questions of law and fact.”152 In effect, this 
holding meant that the Allison court’s “incidental” 23(b)(2) 
predominance test would “serve essentially the same functions as the . . . 
efficiency and manageability standards mandated in 23(b)(3) class 
actions,” i.e., the requirements for superiority and predominance of 
 
 151. Id. (quoting Holmes v. Cont’l Can Co., 706 F.2d 1144, 1154-55 (11th Cir. 1983)). 
 152. Allison, 151 F.3d at 414. 
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common questions.153 With this understanding, the Allison court’s test 
focuses on the amount of time it would take to adjudicate the claims for 
relief requested by the prospective 23(b)(2) class. 
However, the Robinson test better protects judicial economy and 
discretion, and creates an adequate test of monetary predominance 
without re-writing Rule 23(b)(2) as a 23(b)(3) class. The over inclusive 
reach of the “incidental” test is ill-suited for making class certification 
decisions. A bright-line test imposed by a circuit court panel is inflexible 
and unable to account for the factual differences in each case that are a 
hallmark of the common law system. The Robinson court correctly 
concluded that a “case-by-case basis” was superior to the “one-size-fits-
all,” bright-line “incidental” test.154 
This conclusion is supported by the second consideration, judicial 
discretion. Historically, trial judges have been given broad discretion in 
whether or not to certify class actions.155 One leading commentator has 
noted that “the trial court has broad discretion in determining whether the 
action may be maintained as a class action and its determination should 
be given great respect by a reviewing court.”156 The leading treatise on 
class actions states that “no clear standards have been or could be 
developed . . . in this area so pregnant with judicial discretion.”157 Both 
of these texts suggest that the adoption of a bright-line test for 
determining whether or not the requirements for class certification have 
been met is entirely inappropriate. Any such test “nullifies the district 
court’s legislatively granted . . . discretion.”158 It would also negate “the 
district court’s inherent power to manage and control pending 
litigation.”159 
The Allison “incidental” test is subject to all of these criticisms 
because it was created from the court’s consideration of “the principles 
and assumptions underlying the 23(b)(2) class and class actions in 
general.”160 It is precisely the “principles and assumptions” of Rule 23 
and 23(b)(2) requirements that courts have discretion to decide upon in 
light of the facts on a case by case basis. The Allison test dictates the 
result on the principal of class cohesiveness embodied in the adequacy 
 
 153. Id. at 414-15. 
 154. Robinson, 267 F.3d at 164-65. 
 155. Sirota v. Solitron Devices, Inc., 673 F.2d 566, 570-72 (2d Cir. 1982). 
 156. 3 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 23.50 at 1104-05 (3d ed. 
1974). 
 157. 1 HERBERT B. NEWBERG & ALBA CONTE, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 4.14 at 48-49 
(3d ed. 1992). 
 158. Allison, 151 F.3d at 430 (Dennis, J., dissenting). 
 159. Id. at 408. 
 160. Id. at 412. 
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requirement of 23(a) and the lack of judicial economy in a class seeking 
non-incidental monetary relief in a 23(b)(2) class. The Allison court’s 
concerns are therefore better met by the Robinson test, which leaves the 
factual determination of whether the predomination test has been met to 
the district court. Similarly, the Robinson test allows courts to determine 
for themselves the questions of class representation adequacy and 
whether the class would achieve an appreciable measure of judicial 
economy. 
Third, the Allison “incidental” test is an effort to re-write the 
requirements of Rule 23(b)(2) in a way that the drafters of Rule 23 
implicitly rejected. The Allison court recognized that controlling Fifth 
Circuit precedent held that an “inquiry into the manageability or 
superiority of a class action and whether common issues predominate 
over individual ones has ‘no place in determining whether a class should 
be certified under 23(b)(2).’”161 This precedent recognized the rule of 
statutory construction that the explicit inclusion of a requirement in one 
section of legislation excludes its possibility in other relevant sections.162 
This rule should have made it clear that the explicit inclusion of a 
predominance and superiority analysis for a 23(b)(3) class implicitly 
denies its applicability to either a 23(b)(1) or 23(b)(2) class. However, 
the “incidental” test expressly and explicitly seeks to “serve[] essentially 
the same functions as the . . . efficiency and manageability standards 
mandated in [23](b)(3) class actions.”163 The “incidental test” should be 
rejected for this reason alone, as it re-writes the requirements of the 
23(b)(2) class to include findings of both superiority and predominance 
in order to satisfy 23(b)(2)’s monetary damages “predominance” test. 
The Robinson test, rather than re-writing the rules for certifying a 
23(b)(2) class, properly depends on the discretion of district courts to 
ensure that the textual requirements of 23(b)(2) and the constitutional 
requirements of due process are met. 
VII.  BIFURCATION, PRECEDENT, AND JUDICIAL ECONOMY 
In Robinson, the plaintiffs asked the court to certify a bifurcated 
proceeding, in which the liability phase of the pattern or practice claim 
would be certified under (b)(2) and the damages phase under (b)(3).164 
Robinson approved a (b)(2) liability only class after finding that it would 
significantly promote judicial economy and was proper under Rule 
 
 161. Id. at 414 n.8 (quoting Forbush v. J.C. Penney Co., 994 F.2d 1101, 1105 (5th Cir. 1993)). 
 162. The formal name for this rule of construction is expressio unius est exclusio alterius. 
 163. Allison, 151 F.3d at 430. 
 164. Robinson v. Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co., 267 F.3d 147 (2d Cir. 2001). 
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23(c)(4).165 In contrast, the Allison court failed to see the relationship 
between a disparate treatment and pattern or practice claim.166 
Additionally, Allison followed Fifth Circuit precedent holding that the 
use of (c)(4) would be an inappropriate circumvention of (b)(3) 
certification.167 
First, the Robinson decision should be followed instead of Allison 
because the former is supported by the plain meaning of (c)(4).  Second, 
the Robinson court corrects Allison’s misunderstanding of the 
relationship between a disparate treatment and pattern or practice claim. 
This misunderstanding led the Allison court to believe that judicial 
economy would not be served by certifying a liability only (b)(2) class. 
A.  The Text of Rule 23(c)(4) 
Rule 23(c)(4) allows courts to certify “an action . . . with respect to 
particular issues” only.168 The policy behind this Rule is to allow courts 
to certify distinct issues in order “to reduce the range of disputed issues” 
in complex litigation.169 Additionally, this Rule allows courts to “achieve 
judicial efficiencies” by reducing the need for a common issue to be 
adjudicated more than once through the use of class certification.170 
Commentators agree that a class that would fail the common question 
requirement of Rule 23 may be creatively sub-classed or the proceedings 
may be bifurcated to allow class certification.171 Bifurcated proceedings 
are generally limited by a requirement that the use of Rule 23(c)(4) to 
“manufacture” predominance be limited only to those common issues 
whose resolution will materially advance the adjudication of the entire 
litigation.172 This requirement ensures that certification of the issue 
specific class “will materially advance [the] disposition of the litigation 
as a whole.”173 
 
 165. Id. at 168-69. 
 166. Allison, 151 F.3d at 421. 
 167. Id. 
 168. See Eubanks v. Billington, 110 F. 3d 87 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
 169. In re A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 709, 740 (4th Cir. 1989). 
 170. Cent. Wesleyan Coll. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 6 F.3d 177, 185 (4th Cir. 1993). 
 171. 32B AM. JUR. 2D. Federal Courts §1994 (2002). (“[T]he court may limit the class to 
those members having common questions . . . . Furthermore, questions of liability may be separated 
from individual questions of damages . . . .”). 
 172. See In re Kirschner Med. Corp. Sec. Litig., 139 F.R.D. 74 (D. Md. 1991) (holding that 
when the liability issues are common to the class, common questions predominate over individual 
ones); 32B AM. JUR. 2D. Federal Courts §1994 (“[I]t is not necessary that the issues considered in 
the partial class action predominate when compared with all the issues in the case.”). 
 173. See In re Tetracycline Cases, 107 F.R.D. 719, 727 (W.D. Mo. 1985). 
STAMPS - MACRO FINAL 4/30/2003  5:30 PM 
411] TITLE VII 439 
B.  Plain Meaning: Robinson and Allison/Castano 
The plain meaning and substantial weight of authority support the 
Robinson court’s use of Rule 23(c)(4) to bifurcate the liability and 
damages issues. In contrast, the Allison court’s lack of analysis and 
complete reliance upon Castano v. American Tobacco Co., to deny the 
use of Rule 23(c)(4) in bifurcating a trial should be rejected.174 The 
Castano court ruled, “A district court cannot manufacture predominance 
through the nimble use of subdivision (c)(4).”175 The court held that to 
use Rule 23(c)(4) to bifurcate issues would “eviscerate the predominance 
requirement of Rule 23(b)(3)“ resulting in “automatic certification in 
every case where there is a common issue.”176 The Allison court applied 
this holding in rejecting plaintiff’s request for a bifurcated Rule 23(b)(3) 
trial because it had already found that individualized issues predominated 
over common issues and felt it inappropriate to “manufacture” 
predominance and allow bifurcation.177 
However, the logic of Castano should be distinguished in cases 
involving Title VII claims. In Taylor v. D.C. Water & Sewer Authority, a 
Title VII class action, the court ruled that Castano was easily 
distinguishable from the facts in both the instant case and Allison 
because “Castano was a mass torts action involving millions of class 
members and wide variations in state law.”178 In Taylor the court 
appropriately recognized that while wholesale use of Rule 23(c)(4) in 
order to effectively subclass all of the plaintiffs was inappropriate, this 
logic did not apply to the simple bifurcation of liability and damage 
issues and subsequently certified a bifurcated Title VII class.179 
The Robinson court’s decision to bifurcate and certify a liability only 
Rule 23(b)(2) class comports with the plain language of Rule 23(c)(4) 
allowing issue certification. First, the advisory committee note expressly 
endorses the certification of liability issues. It approved of this procedure 
by stating that in some cases an “action may retain its ‘class’ character 
only through the adjudication of liability to the class.”180 Second, as one 
commentator noted, “A plain reading of Rule 23(c)(4) seems to allow 
this type of certification . . . [because] the court has the power to sever 
 
 174. Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996). 
 175. Id. at 745 n.21. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 422 (5th Cir. 1998). 
 178. Taylor v. D.C. Water & Sewer Auth., 205 F.R.D. 43, 50 (D.D.C. 2002). 
 179. Id. 
 180. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4) advisory committee note. 
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any issues that it deems appropriate and try them separately.”181 Third, 
another commentator has gone so far as to say that the “drastic step[]” of 
dismissing a class should never be taken “whenever the court can 
profitably isolate the class issues under Rule 23(c)(4)” and that the Rule 
places an affirmative duty upon the court to do so.182 These 
considerations strongly militate towards the use of bifurcation under 
Rule 23(c)(4) in Title VII cases. 
C.  Analysis: Judicial Economy 
The Robinson court properly recognized that a judicial economy of 
scale could be created even if only the liability phase of a Title VII suit 
was certified for class treatment. Regardless of the outcome on the 
merits, bifurcation creates an economy of scale. This finding is superior 
to that of the Allison court, which misunderstood the relationship 
between pattern or practice and disparate treatment claims. In fact, while 
the claims focus on different theories for proving liability, both require a 
prima facie case of discrimination and employer liability.183 Therefore, 
while certification should be proper for the damages phase under either 
Rule 23(b)(2) or (b)(3),184 the Robinson court recognized that judicial 
economies of scale result from resolving liability as a class issue even if 
compensatory and punitive damages proceed by individual 
adjudication.185 
1.  Cooper on Title VII: Allison got it all wrong 
What is the relationship of disparate treatment to pattern or practice 
claims? The answer to this critical question determines whether 
bifurcating proceedings creates judicial economy. The Allison court 
decided there was “none” and rejected certification of a liability phase 
only class. Allison failed to “see how certifying the first stage of the 
 
 181. Robert M. Brava-Partain, Due Process, Rule 23, and Hybrid Classes: A Practical 
Solution, 53 Hastings L.J. 1359, 1375 (2002). 
 182. 7B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 1790 (2nd ed. 1986). 
 183. See Craik v. Minn. State Univ. Bd., 731 F. 2d 465, 470 (8th Cir. 1984) (“In pattern or 
practice cases, however, the presumption shifts to the employer not only the burden of production, 
but also the burden of persuading the trier of fact that it is more likely than not that the employer did 
not unlawfully discriminate against the individual.”). 
 184. See In re Asbestos Sch. Litig., 104 F.R.D. 422, 431 (D.C.Pa.1984); In re Agent Orange 
Product Liability Litigation, 100 F.R.D. 718, 722 (D.C.N.Y.1983) (need for individual damage 
calculations does not make class action certification inappropriate when common questions as to 
liability predominate). 
 185. Robinson v. Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co., 267 F.3d 147, 168 (2d Cir. 2001) (“[E]ven 
assuming that the remedial stage is ultimately resolved on a non-class basis, the issues and evidence 
relevant to these individual adjudications would be substantially narrowed.”). 
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pattern or practice claim significantly increases the likelihood that later 
certification . . . would be possible.”186 In answering “none,” the Allison 
court relied upon a gross misinterpretation of the Supreme Court’s 
holding in Cooper v. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.187 However, by 
focusing on the continued claims of plaintiffs for statutorily available 
compensatory and punitive damages, the court largely ignored the issue 
of individual liability. Without any independent analysis, and relying 
entirely upon Cooper, the Allison court decided that except for “a shift of 
the burden of proof in the plaintiff’s favor,” there are “no common issues 
between the first stage of a pattern or practice claim and an individual 
discrimination lawsuit.”188 
However, Allison misses Cooper’s point. The Cooper Court found a 
significant relationship between the two types of claims precisely 
because of the plaintiffs’ shifted burden of proof.189 Cooper held that 
neither class representatives for, nor members of, a class are barred by 
res judicata from bringing individual discrimination claims after an 
adverse finding on the merits against the pattern or practice class 
claim.190 The Cooper Court did reason that a “crucial difference” exists 
between the two types of claims because they involve different types of 
evidence and focus on distinct allegedly discriminatory actions taken by 
the employer.191 Therefore, the Cooper Court said, “It could not be more 
plain that the rejection of a claim of classwide discrimination does not 
warrant the conclusion that no member of the class could have a valid 
individual claim.”192 This left the plaintiffs in Cooper free to pursue their 
individual disparate treatment claims. 
In fact, the Teamsters193 Court anticipated and rejected the Allison 
court’s interpretation of Cooper. In interpreting Cooper, the Allison court 
reasoned that there were “no common issues between the first stage of a 
pattern or practice claim and an individual discrimination lawsuit.”194 In 
 
 186. Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 421 (5th Cir. 1998). 
 187. 467 U.S. 867 (1984). 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. at 880 (“The judgment is not, however, dispositive of the individual claims the . . . 
petitioners have alleged in their separate action.”). 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. at 876. (“The crucial difference between an individual’s claim of discrimination and a 
class action alleging a general pattern or practice of discrimination is manifest. The inquiry 
regarding an individual’s claim is the reason for a particular employment decision, while ‘at the 
liability stage of a pattern-or-practice trial the focus often will not be on individual hiring decisions, 
but on a pattern of discriminatory decision making.”) (citing Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United 
States, 431 U.S. 324, 360 n.46 (1977); see also Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 575 
n.7 (1978). 
 192. Cooper, 467 U.S. at 878. 
 193. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977). 
 194. Allison, 151 F.3d at 421. 
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Teamsters, the employer, T.I.M.E.-D.C., Inc. attempted to employ 
similar reasoning. It claimed that the Court’s McDonnell Douglas test 
was the “only means of establishing a prima facie case of individual 
discrimination.”195 However, the Court rejected this contention and 
pointed to explicit language in McDonnell Douglas recognizing that 
“‘[the] facts necessarily will vary in Title VII cases, and . . . the prima 
facie proof required’” will thus also vary.196 From this, the Teamsters 
Court concluded, 
The importance of McDonnell Douglas lies, not in its specification of 
the discrete elements of proof there required, but in its recognition of 
the general principle that any Title VII plaintiff must carry the initial 
burden of offering evidence adequate to create an inference that an 
employment decision was based on a discriminatory criterion illegal 
under the Act.197 
Both the McDonnell Douglas test and the liability phase of a pattern or 
practice suit create a rebuttable presumption of discrimination under 
Title VII. In the language of the Teamsters Court, this rebuttable 
presumption, carries “the initial burden . . . adequate to create an 
inference” of discrimination and “the finding of a pattern or practice 
change[s] the position of the employer to that of a proved wrongdoer.”198 
While Allison got off on the wrong track, Robinson corrects and allows 
for bifurcation. 
2.  Robinson on Cooper: Allison got it wrong 
Robinson correctly understands the relationship between individual 
disparate treatment and pattern or practice class claims and its 
ramifications on judicial economy.199 The Robinson court recognized 
three possible scenarios resulting from certification of a Rule 23(b)(2) 
liability class that would create judicial economy. First, the class might 
prevail and establish an illegal and discriminatory pattern or practice.200 
This would result in “plaintiff class’s eligibility for appropriate 
prospective relief . . . [and] a prima facie case with regard to the remedial 
 
 195. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 358. 
 196. Id. at 358 (citing McDonald Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 n.13 (1973)). 
 197. Id. (emphasis added) 
 198. Id. at 358-59 (“[B]y ‘demonstrating the existence of a discriminatory hiring pattern and 
practice’ the plaintiffs had made out a prima facie case of discrimination against the individual class 
members.”). 
 199. The Robinson court did not directly address Allison’s misunderstanding and failure to 
achieve the judicial economy of bifurcation. Robinson v. Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co., 267 F.3d 
147, 168 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 200. Id. 
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phase of the suit.”201 Second, the case might proceed on a “non-class” 
individual basis. In that case, “the issues and evidence relevant to these 
individual adjudications would be substantially narrowed,” because of 
the establishment of the prima facie case of liability established which 
attaches to each individual.202 Third, the defendant might prevail, 
“eliminating entirely the need for a remedial stage inquiry.”203 
Robinson establishes that bifurcation of the liability and damages 
phase achieves judicial economy regardless of the outcome. First, the 
establishment of liability in a pattern or practice class would substantially 
“reduce the range of issues in dispute” and make certification of a Rule 
(b)(2) or (b)(3) damages class more likely.204 Second, in the event that 
class certification for the damages phase was inappropriate, the 
individual members of the class would not each have to proceed through 
the liability phase of a disparate treatment case. Third, the victory of the 
defendant would obviate the need for any further proceedings on the 
issue of class liability and any individual plaintiffs would be able to bring 
their cases. 
Other courts have also realized the enormous judicial economy of 
scale that is achieved by class treatment of the liability phase. One court 
reasoned: 
It seems specious and begging the question to say that if these 500 law 
suits were brought into a class so that proof on the issues of conspiracy 
need be adduced only once and the result then becomes binding on all 
500, that thereby the common issue of conspiracy no longer 
predominates because from a total time standpoint, cumulatively 
individual damage proof will take longer.205 
To illustrate, instead of five hundred plaintiffs each having to make a 
prima facie disparate treatment case, the matter is greatly simplified by 
their ability to make one prima facie “pattern or practice” case to prove 
defendant’s liability (or innocence). While the 500:1 ratio above might 
be a best case scenario, one study found that “separation of issues,” such 
as the bifurcation of liability and damages, “will save, on the average, 
about 20 per cent of the time that would be required if these cases were 
tried under traditional rules.”206 While bifurcation will not eliminate 
 
 201. Id. (quoting Craik v. Minn. State Univ. Bd., 731 F.2d 465, 470 (8th Cir. 1984)). 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. 
 205. Minnesota v. U.S. Steel Corp., 44 F.R.D. 559, 569 (D.C. Minn.1968). 
 206. Hans Zeisel & Thomas Callahan, Split Trials and Time Saving: A Statistical Analysis 76 
HARV. L. REV. 1606, 1608 (1963). The five hundred plaintiff hypothetical is not far from the truth in 
the post-Allison Title VII world. In one case, a court applying the Allison test denied class 
certification and was then faced with over 180 individually filed cases when the individual plaintiffs 
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individual suits or be appropriate in all circumstances, in applicable cases 
it creates an enormous judicial economy of scale and should be received 
favorably by courts considering whether or not to actively use Rule 
23(c)(4). Therefore, the propriety and availability of bifurcated 
proceedings provides another reason to follow Robinson instead of 
Allison. However, in addition to the analytical and economic superiority 
of Robinson, significant policy and practical considerations also favor its 
adoption over Allison. 
VIII.  POLICY AND PRACTICE: WHILE ALLISON DERAILS, ROBINSON 
TRACKS CONGRESS 
Legislative intent and the continued threat of negative value suits 
should encourage courts to adopt the Robinson balancing test instead of 
Allison’s bright line test. As discussed in Part II, Section A, above, 
legislative history demonstrates a clear congressional intent to increase 
Title VII litigation and combat discrimination.207 Therefore, the threat of 
eviscerating effective Title VII enforcement should give courts pause 
when evaluating whether to follow Robinson or Allison as precedent. 
Allison threatens Title VII enforcement because it de facto denies the use 
of class litigation to plaintiffs who then face the continued existence of 
the negative value suit dilemma. Robinson stays on track and provides a 
legal framework upholding the proven use of class action procedures to 
enforce Title VII. Given the negative value suit threat and congressional 
intent, courts should actively seek any and all procedural rules and trial 
techniques available to prevent potential constitutional concerns that 
threaten enforcement of constitutional rights guaranteed by Title VII. 
This section lays out the theoretical and empirical case for the continued 
certification of Title VII class actions. 
Legally, Allison barred the door to the federal judiciary for plaintiff’s 
seeking to use Rule 23 to enforce violations of Title VII. By denying 
certification under either Rule 23(b)(2) or (b)(3), litigants are left to bring 
individual suits. The Allison court was persuaded that attorney’s fees, in 
addition to the availability of compensatory and punitive damages, 
constituted a sufficient inducement for private Title VII enforcement.208 
 
refused to be denied their day in court. Miller v. Hygrade Food Prods., Inc., 198 F.R.D. 638 (E.D. 
Pa. Jan. 29, 2001); Personal Interview with Mr. Stephen Whinston, Berger & Montague, P.C., (June 
15, 2002). 
 207. See supra notes 18-24. 
 208. Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 419-20 (5th Cir. 1998). 
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However, empirical research on twelve cases denied class certification in 
the wake of Allison refutes this assumption.209 
Currently, numerous potential plaintiffs face the negative value suit 
dilemma following class certification denials based on the Allison test. 
Of the twelve cases that directly followed Allison in denying class 
certification, only two of the attorneys contacted indicated that individual 
suits had continued after the denial of certification.210 The other attorneys 
interviewed provided several reasons why individual actions were not 
economically feasible. First, fees are only available to the prevailing 
party.211 Recently, the Supreme Court has limited the definition of 
prevailing party, making it even harder for attorneys to take on fee-
shifting cases in the hope of being awarded attorney’s fees.212 
Second, the costs of the litigation, which must be borne upfront, 
usually by the attorney or firm handling the case, can be prohibitive. In 
one case where class certification was denied, over one million dollars 
was spent simply pursuing certification.213 While individual actions 
would be much less expensive, one attorney indicated that cost efficiency 
reasons would prevent the use of the necessary “statistical evidence for 
individual case[s].”214 Costly statistical analysis is commonly used as 
evidence to prove disparities between the average hourly pay of the 
protected class of employees and other employees. Such statistical 
 
 209. From July 16 to July 18, 2002, the author interviewed plaintiff’s attorneys in the 
following twelve cases: Carson v. Giant Food, Inc. 187 F. Supp.2d 462 (D. Md. 2002); Reid v. 
Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co., 205 F.R.D. 655 (N.D. Ga. 2001); Bacon v. Honda of Am. Mfg., 
Inc., 205 F.R.D. 466 (S.D. Ohio 2001); Miller v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 202 F.R.D. 195 (D. 
Md. 2001); Riley v. Compucom Sys., Inc., 2000 WL 343189 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 2000); Burrell v. 
Crown Cent. Petroleum, Inc. 197 F.R.D. 284 (E.D. Tex. 2000); Adams. v. Henderson, 197 F.R.D. 
162 (D. Md. 2000); Hoffman v. Honda of Am. Mfg., Inc., 191 F.R.D. 530 (S.D. Ohio. 1999); Faulk 
v. Home Oil Co., 186 F.R.D. 660 (M.D. Ala. 1999); Zachery v. Texaco Exploration & Prod. Inc., 
185 F.R.D. 230 (W.D. Tex. 1999); Miller v. Hygrade Food Prods. Corp., 198 F.R.D. 638 (E.D. Pa. 
2001); Barabin v. Aramark Corp., 210 F.R.D. 152 (E.D. Pa. 2002). 
 210. Mr. Stephen Whinston, a partner in Berger & Montague, P.C., and counsel of record in 
Miller and Aramark, indicated that his firm filed individual complaints for over 180 of the Miller 
class members. However, this was a strategic move made in order to gain the attention of the courts. 
Under regular circumstances, nearly all of these individual cases would not have been filed. Personal 
Interview with Mr. Stephen Whinston, Berger & Montague, P.C., (June 15, 2002). The other 
example was in the Reid case. There, the firm informed their clients of the result of a denial of class 
certification and proceeded on an individual basis only with those clients who wished to proceed on 
an individual basis and had signed retainer agreements. Even then, many named plaintiffs may 
choose not to continue on an individual basis. In Reid, over half of the named plaintiffs decided not 
to pursue individual actions.  Telephone Interview with Ms. Angela Joy Mason, The Cochran Firm 
(July 17, 2002). 
 211. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982). 
 212. Buckhannon Bd. and Care Home, Inc., v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health and Human Res., 532 
U.S. 598, 607 (2001). 
 213. Bacon, 205 F.R.D. 466. Telephone Interview with Mr. Robert Steinberg, (July 17, 2002). 
 214. Burrell, 197 F.R.D. 284. Telephone Interview with Mr. Ruben Guttman, (July 17, 2002). 
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evidence is often necessary to ferret out workplace discrimination 
because of the rarity of direct evidence.215 
Third, many individual attorneys and small firms are simply 
economically unable to accept fee shifting cases. An individual disparate 
treatment case can require from $100,000 to $200,000 in attorney’s fees 
and costs alone.216 Additionally, while expert witness and investigation 
fees may be recoverable, not all other costs will be.217 This results in 
potential plaintiffs and their attorneys having to pay extra expenses in 
order to bring a Title VII action. Fourth, “individually bringing cases is 
impossible” in many cases simply due to the large number of possible 
plaintiffs.218 This is not an economic consideration, but one of sufficient 
numbers of attorneys to handle the potential number of cases. Fifth, firm 
economics and attorney time are not the only limitation in bringing 
individual suits. Many possible plaintiffs might not wish to pursue 
individual litigation because of a desire to avoid personal involvement in 
litigation, a fear of retaliation, a perception of nominal claim(s), or other 
reasons.219 While the 1991 Amendments provided compensatory and 
punitive damages in order to encourage and reward private citizens for 
enforcing the law, the amount is limited by the employer’s size and could 
be as small as $50,000 total for both types of damages.220 
One limitation courts have considered in relation to the existence of a 
negative value suit is the possibility of a blackmail class.221 However, 
this concern should not enter into the court’s analysis and could be 
considered an abuse of discretion. After Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,222 
it is clear that an inquiry into the merits of the class is not appropriate at 
the certification stage. The only proper inquiry is whether or not 
 
 215. See Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541 (1999) (Discussing the fact that after nearly forty 
years of discrimination lawsuits, facial and direct discrimination in the workplace has become 
increasingly rare. However, discrimination in the workplace remains and statistical evidence is used 
to prove or disprove the existence of discriminatory employment practices.). 
 216. Farias v. Instructional Sys., Inc., 259 F.3d 91, 102-03 (2d Cir. 2001) (allowing fees and 
costs of $132,193.75); Bishop v. Gainer, 272 F.3d 1009, 1020 (7th Cir. 2001) (allowing fees and 
costs of $238,000). 
 217. Mota v. Univ. of Tex. Houston Health Science Ctr., 261 F.3d 512, 530 (5th Cir. 2001) 
(investigation fees recoverable, but costs of videotaped depositions and mediation fees not 
recoverable under Title VII). 
 218. See supra note 207. 
 219. Telephone Interview with Ms. Angela Joy Mason, The Cochran Firm (July 17, 2002). 
 220. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (2000). 
 221. In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1297-99, 1302-03 (7th Cir. 1995) (Judge 
Posner described a blackmail class as one where the “sheer magnitude of the risk to which the class 
action, in contrast to the individual actions pending or likely, exposes [the defendants]” to legal 
blackmail.). 
 222. 417 U.S. 156 (1974) (holding that any factual inquiry into the merits of a claim, as 
opposed to factual inquiry regarding the requirements of Rule 23, is inappropriate when deciding 
upon class certification). 
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plaintiffs meet the textual requirements of Rule 23. While certification of 
a class bent on pursuing an impermissible motive might create 
tremendous pressure for the defendant to settle, it should instead seek to 
use the procedural weapons available to it that properly address the 
merits, i.e. either a 12(b)(6) or summary judgment motion. Either motion 
would defeat a class truly without merit. If a claim can survive both of 
these motions then any pressure to settle is proper. Defendants feeling 
otherwise should take the matter up in Congress, not attempt to persuade 
courts to legislate an additional requirement into class certification. On 
balance, the possibility of negative value suits precluding the 
enforcement of Title VII by private litigation should be a strong 
consideration taken into account by courts when deciding class action 
certification. 
IX.  CONCLUSION: ROBINSON IS THE RIGHT TRACK FOR TITLE VII CLASS 
LITIGATION 
Courts deciding whether to follow the Allison or Robinson line face a 
difficult decision. Decisions such as this determine whether the judiciary 
is willing to accept its duty to enforce Title VII. For over twenty-five 
years, the pattern or practice class has proven itself as an effective 
deterrent and motivation for employers to eliminate large-scale 
discrimination in the workplace. Courts denying certification for run-of-
the-mill disparate treatment class actions effectively eviscerate Title VII 
enforcement. These 
courts face two consequences. First, many individual plaintiffs may 
be effectively barred from bringing their claims due to the small 
recoveries available compared to litigation expenses. Second, where 
sufficient recoveries are available or where the discrimination is severe, 
court dockets will be clogged with individual claims which could have 
been more effectively and economically adjudicated on a class basis. 
A thorough comparison of the Robinson and Allison decisions 
demonstrates that effective Title VII enforcement is threatened by the 
over-inclusive bright-line “incidental” test of monetary predominance 
advocated by Allison.  The Allison test de facto denies the utilization of 
Rule 23(b)(2) class actions to plaintiffs that seek compensatory and 
punitive damages provided by Title VII. In the name of preventing 
unmanageable classes which pose a constitutional risk to due process, the 
test departs from the advisory committee’s suggestion for directly 
comparing the relationship between the equitable and monetary relief 
requested by the class. This departure creates an over-inclusive test 
which denies legitimate non-predominant monetary claims class 
certification. In effect, the Allison test requires putative Rule 23(b)(2) 
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classes to meet the superiority and predominance requirements of a Rule 
23(b)(3) class. This interpretation of Rule 23(b)(2) represents a radical 
departure from its creation as a procedure intended to facilitate civil 
rights enforcement. To add insult to textual injury, Allison also holds that 
putative classes seeking monetary damages will usually fail the 
superiority and predominance requirements of Rule 23(b)(3) due to 
unmanageable class sizes and the predominance of individual issues in 
determining damages. Allison further shuts the door of the judiciary to 
Title VII class litigation by denying the use of bifurcated liability and 
damages proceedings due to the risk of violating the Seventh 
Amendment. 
In stark contrast, the Robinson court allows Title VII class litigation 
to get back on track and into the courts. Rather than abdicate its duty to 
adjudicate Title VII claims, 
The Robinson court tackles the jurisprudential and constitutional 
concerns of Allison head on. First, the Robinson court fashioned a Rule 
23(b)(2) test of monetary predominance that directly compares the 
relationship between the equitable and monetary relief requested. 
Robinson provides courts with an objective, narrowly-tailored test which 
can weed out monetary claims that “predominate” over equitable relief 
without being over-inclusive and precluding non-predominating, yet still 
substantial, monetary relief. The balancing test also preserves the 
discretion of the district court to make class certification decisions 
without undue appellate second-guessing. Second, Robinson approves 
the use of bifurcated proceedings to adjudicate the issue of Title VII 
liability. This decision corrects Allison’s legal derailment and 
misinterpretation about the relationship between pattern or practice and 
individual disparate treatment claims. Bifurcation also allows an over-
worked judiciary to achieve a significant economy of scale in 
adjudicating Title VII claims. Finally, Robinson defends the historic role 
of Rule 23(b)(2) class actions in enforcing Title VII. This decision 
reflects proper deference to congressional intent and allows 
discrimination victims to avail themselves of class litigation in order to 
avoid the negative value suit dilemma. 
The current failure of the judiciary to follow Robinson’s superior 
legal analysis will result in either a congressional override statue or the 
resolution of the dispute by the Supreme Court. Although the Supreme 
Court refused to grant certiorari on Robinson to resolve the split with 
Allison, they will receive another opportunity when the Ninth Circuit re-
issues its opinion on Molski v. Gleich.223 Regardless of Molski’s decision 
 
 223. 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 2055 (9th Cir. Feb. 6, 2003). 
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on whether to follow Allison or Robinson, the wide divide between the 
two monetary predominance tests demands resolution. Therefore, the 
Supreme Court should grant certiorari in Molski. Furthermore, given the 
important jurisprudential and policy reasons articulated in this Comment, 
the Supreme Court should follow the Robinson court’s track and let 
Allison’s precedential value derail. 
W. Lyle Stamps 
 
